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We believe that the provision of securi-ty in systems is a subset of the sys-
tems engineering discipline, and that it has a
heavy software-engineering component. As
software engineers, we understand that the
determination and application of measures
and metrics is not an exact science, nor is it
easily accomplished. We also realize that this
difficulty carries over to the trusted systems
world. How one measures the degree of
protection present is, today, an unsolved
question and is primarily accomplished by
craftsmanship and not science.
This issue of rating and ranking systems
in terms of their assurance characteristics
was at least partially addressed at a work-
shop on information security system ratings
and ranking in Williamsburg, Va.,2 in spring
2001. We will hereafter refer to this as the
workshop, as we reference it in support of
our belief.
Workshop Findings and
Observations
It appears that while we often claim to have
metrics that prove or indicate assurance lev-
els, we do not seem to be able to prove that
correctness, maintainability, reliability, and
other such nonfunctional system require-
ments are in the software we build. We also
tend to use empirical evidence based on his-
torical performance data in claiming system
strength. However, knowing that a particu-
lar defensive strategy has worked well in the
past for an organization really says very lit-
tle about its strength for the future.
Examples of software engineering difficul-
ties that we face in predicting a system’s
strength include the following:
• Software is not subject to the laws of
physics. In most cases, we cannot apply
mathematics to code to prove correct-
ness in the same way a bridge builder
can apply formulae to prove structural
strength characteristics.
• People who are, by nature, error prone
build software. In the end, any one of
them can intentionally or unintentional-
ly corrupt the system and greatly dimin-
ish assurance.
• Compositions of mechanisms used to
construct a security perimeter comply
with no known algebra. We remain
reliant on the expertise of our systems
administrators or security engineers.
• It is easier to attack a system today (an
assurance issue) than it was years ago.
This trend is likely to continue as attack
tools are further automated, shared,
and explored on a global basis.
The workshop attempted to address
these issues and others. Although many
specific techniques and suggestions were
proffered to the group, it was apparent to
all that some combination of measures was
essential, and that this combination could
not generically be applied across all interest
domains. Similarly, it was clear that the
measures or metrics adopted by an organi-
zation to determine assurance need to be
frequently revisited and re-validated.
Attempts to apply a single rating to a
system have been tried in the past and have
failed [1, 2]. The workshop organizers also
agreed that the problem domain might be
best viewed using a non-disjoint partition-
ing into technical, organizational, and oper-
ational categories.
Definitions agreed upon by the confer-
ence organizers in the technical category
were measures/metrics that are used to
describe and/or compare technical objects
(e.g., algorithms, products, or designs).
Organizational measures might be used
with respect to processes and programs.
Operational measures are thought to
describe as is systems, operating practices,
and specific environments.
An interesting characterization of
information security metrics came from
Deb Bodeau of The Mitre Corporation [3]
who pointed out that a proper view of
these metrics might be a cross product
involving what needs to be measured, why
you need to measure it, and for whom you
are measuring. Her characterization of this
view in Figure 1 is enlightening.
Another interesting observation made
by several attendees was that the desired
purpose for such measures and metrics
seemed to vary between the government
and commercial sectors. Government
applications seem much more likely to use
metrics and measures for upward report-
ing. Answering such questions as “What is
our current assurance posture?” “How are
we doing this month compared with last?”
and “Are we compliant with applicable reg-
ulations and directives?” seemed to be a
driver for the metrics needed by govern-
ment.
The representatives at the workshop
from the commercial world seemed less
interested in these questions and more
inclined to look for answers to the ques-
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ious categories of information assurance metrics that may be helpful to an organization that
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tions “How strong is my security perime-
ter?” “What is the return on my invest-
ment?” “What is my level of risk or expo-
sure?” and “How does product perform-
ance compare?” The commercial sector
seemed to have far more interest in techni-
cal and operational measures than in
process or organizational measures.
The workshop attendees had hoped to
find a number of objective, quantitative
metrics that could be applied. Although
unanimous agreement was not reached, it
was apparent to most that such metrics
were in short supply, had to be combined
with other measures or metrics in a partic-
ular context, and were generally not very
useful on their own. Many more measures
that would be considered subjective and/or
qualitative appeared more useful.
Examples of more useful measures
might include adversary work factor – a
form of penetration testing. An excellent
discussion of this topic is found in
Schuedel and Wood [4]. Although penetra-
tion techniques are not truly repeatable and
consistent, the workshop attendees agreed
that their results were meaningful and use-
ful. Risk assessments, in their various
forms, were also found to be useful meas-
ures of assurance. Such assessments are
accomplished in a variety of ways, but tend
to focus attention in the proper areas and
give a good indication of how one is pos-
tured to withstand attacks on a system.
Information Assurance (IA) metrics are
essential for measuring the goodness of IA,
and we believe that overall useful IA met-
rics are possible. There is general agree-
ment that no single system metric or any
one perfect set of IA metrics applies across all
systems. Which set will be most useful for
an organization largely depends on its IA
goals; its technical, organizational, and
operational needs; and the resources that it
can make available.
In order to help an organization inves-
tigate options for IA metrics, it is useful to
look at the different categories of IA met-
rics in general. These categories are
described as follows:3
Objective/Subjective
Objective IA metrics (e.g., mean annual
downtime for a system) are more desirable
than subjective IA metrics (e.g., amount of
training a user needs to have to securely
use the system). Since subjectivity is inher-
ent in IA, subjective IA metrics are more
available.
Quantitative/Qualitative
Quantitative IA metrics (e.g., number of
failed login attempts) are more preferable
than qualitative IA metrics (e.g., the
Federal Information Technology Security
Assessment Framework [5] self-assess-
ment levels).
Static/Dynamic
Dynamic IA metrics evolve with time, static
metrics do not. An example of static IA
metrics can be the percentage of staff who
received annual security refresher training
[3]. This metric can degrade in value if the
content of the course does not change over
time. An example of dynamic IA metrics
can be the percentage of staff who received
training on the current version of the soft-
ware package they use. Most metrics used in
penetration testing are dynamic. Dynamic
IA metrics are more useful than static
because best practices change over time
with technology. There is always need to
adapt metrics in compliance with best prac-
tices [6].
Absolute/Relative
Absolute metrics do not depend on any
other measures, and these either do or do
not exist [3]. For example, the number of
systems administrator, networking, and
security-certified security engineers in an
organization is an absolute metric. Relative
metrics are only meaningful in context. For
example, the number of vulnerabilities in a
system cannot assess the system’s IA pos-
ture alone. The type and strength of vulner-
abilities are also important in this context
for making any decision about the system’s
IA posture. The majority of IA metrics are
relative, and so they would not be good for
use as a single-system metric.
Direct/Indirect
Direct IA metrics can be generated from
observing the property that they measure.
For example, the number of invalid packets
rejected by a firewall over a certain period of
time. Indirect IA metrics are derived by
evaluation (e.g., ISO Standard 15408 The
Common Criteria) and/or assessment (e.g.,
risk assessment). Although preferred, some-
times it is not possible to measure directly.
In these cases, indirect measures are useful.
IA is a triad of cooperation between the
technology that provides assurance, the
processes that leverage that technology, and
the people who apply and make the tech-
nology work [7]. IA metrics should be all
encompassing – the product, the process,
and the people, because processes build
products that people use. If we want to be
assured that proper information protection
is in place, we need to know what it is that
we wish to protect, that we have the right
product for protection, that the product was
built correctly, and that the right people are
using it properly.
Summary
The workshop was successful in focusing
attention on the area of metrics or meas-
ures for systems that have security or assur-
ance as a requirement. It was not successful
in getting agreement on a set of measures
to be used, or even finding consensus in any
particular approach. Nonetheless, several
themes emerged from this workshop that
may be useful. These are reported below, as
taken from the draft proceedings of the
workshop at the time of this writing.
• There will be no successful single meas-
ure or metric that can quantify the
assurance present in a system. Multiple
measures will most certainly be need-
ed, and they will need to be refreshed
frequently.
• Software and systems engineering are
very much related to this problem: The
quality of the software delivered, the
architectures and designs chosen, the
tools used to build systems, the speci-
fied requirements, and more are all
related to assurance.
• Penetration testing is, today, a valid
measurement method. It is imperfect
and to some extent non-repeatable, but
nonetheless, it is used in both govern-
ment and the commercial sectors.
Several other testing measures are valu-
able: They include level of effort, num-
bers of vulnerabilities found (or not
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Figure 1: Characterization of Information Security Metrics (Bodeau)
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found), and number of penetrations.
• There are differences between the gov-
ernment and the commercial sectors.
One is policy driven – the other is prof-
it driven. Defense in depth and breadth
is important. Knowing how to measure
this defense is also important and a valid
research area. There was no agreement
on how to accomplish this measure-
ment.
• Attempts to quantify and obtain a par-
tial ordering of the security attributes of
systems in the past have not been suc-
cessful to a large degree (e.g., the
Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation
Criteria and the Common Criteria [1,
2]).
• Processes, procedures, tools, and people
all interact to produce assurance in sys-
tems. Measures that incorporate all of
these are important. We believe Bodeau
has characterized this very well in
Figure 1 (see page 31).
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